Leitura de "Model Based and Manipulative Abduction in Science"

Texto na Íntegra, para anotações coletivas

(Anotações do Bráulio)

Notas posliminares

Muito denso, não deve ser indicado como leitura inicial. Sugiro entrarmos pelas "isotecnologias", mais especificamente as "isolitotecnologias" (isegoria, isonomia e isopsefia). Parece-me especialmente estratégico começarmos pela "isopsefia" dada a celeuma das urnas eletrônicas e do "voto auditável", para produzir um texto didático e convidativo.

(Ober fala dos três isos, mas não nota a importância dos arranjos minerais. Latour (Da Realpolitik à Ðingpolitik) não problematiza a produção de desigualdade dos arranjos... Serres não foca na discussão sobre democracia, explicitamente. Há o que se produzir nessa costura)

Paralelamente, vamos produzindo um ensaio filosófico sobre o a política do design dos ambientes políticos, o "Isotecnologias".

A questão da definição de liberdade: a republicana é agir junto ( mas é imprecisa para definir como/para quem/por quem produzir saber sobre como desejarmos junto: o paradoxo da "vontade comum", que só se torna comum depois de apresentada hipoteticamente -- ref. Runciman, 2007; Dish, 2009)

Publicar em revistas de filosofia, design, comunicação e ciência política.

Notas preliminares

A leitura desse paper foi provocada pela referência feita a ele pelo proprio autor em Ritual Artifacts as Symbolic Habits, leitura que também comentamos, aqui.

A discussão apresenta paralelos sistemáticas com as reflexões sobre como a carnadura é semantizada como corpo, em:

• Nöe, Alva. (2004) Action in Perception : A exploração do movimento seria a origem da manipulação abdutiva do corpo que organiza a percepção, fornecendo a base mais universal de "clareza" e "plausibilidade" de futuras abduções baseadas e modelo
• Fédida, P (1978) L'"objeu": objet, jeu et enfance - L'espace psychothérapeutique: A conexão de desejo e movimento corporal é elucidada detalhadamente, implicando também a proxemia/cinética/háptica do corpo do psicanalista - a capacidade de jogar objetos é decisiva para a saúde mental.
• Sobchack, Vivian C. (1982) Toward inhabited space: The semiotic structure of camera movement in the cinema: o cinema (e outros arranjos artefatuais de percepção) provê um campo de coletivização da percepção: a reversibilidade entre expressão e percepção
• Tomas, D. (1996) Transcultural Spaces, Transcultural Beings (apoiado na teoria do mimetismo e da psicastenia legendária de Roger Caillois)

Esta argumentação conecta-se tb com varias argumentações acerca da produção de imagens de corpos coletivos, a partir de

• Aura (Benjamin) // Fatiches (Latour) // Noth (1990) Magia // Magnani (2018) Ritual Artifacts as Symbolic Habits
• Hoffman (2001) Non-dual Awareness and Logic // Vaijracchedika // Warner (2002) Publics and Counterpublics
• Qibla/Mirhab >> perspectiva artificial >> máquinas de dominar com o olhar para mobilizar multidões (Latour (2015) Cognição e Visualização)
• Gigantes x Enxames: (Lefort (1979) The Image of the Body of the Totalitarism; Warner, M (1992) The mass public and the mass subject) x (Thacker, Galloway (2007) The Exploit; Vehlken, S. (2013)
• Arranjos minerais igualitários: Isopsefia, Isegoria e Isonomia: para estar junto: Ober, Josiah (2007) The original meaning of “democracy”// Latour (2004, From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik – An Introduction to Making Things Public). + Schwartzberg, Melissa (2010) Shouts, Murmurs and Votes: Acclamation and Aggregation in Ancient Greece + Schemeil, Yves (2000) Democracy before Democracy? - [idealizações liberais sobre a operação das instituições democraticas] Urbinati, Nadia (2000) Representation as Advocacy_ A Study of Democratic Deliberation

Trechos comentados:

(Abstact):

theoretical abduction ... illustrates ...the objective of selecting and creating a set of hypotheses that are able to dispense good (preferred) explanations of data, but fails to account for many cases ... when the exploitation of the environment is crucial. ...

manipulative abduction is devoted to capture the role of action in many interesting situations: [where] action provides otherwise unavailable information that enables the agent to solve problems by starting and performing a suitable abductive process of generation or selection of hypotheses.

Ponto de partida: limitações das "abduções teoréticas" (ou "sentenciais", ou "baseadas em modelos") em que a "ação" para a "exploração do ambiente" é decisiva.

[Porém... a escrita as escritas (e as falas, e outras formas de inscrição e comunicação simbólica) já não seriam "modelos"? Os modelos não seriam a introjeção da terceiridade inicialmente experimentada na mobilização do corpo e dos corpos (Nöe), o próprio e os alheios, na operação da reversibilidade entre sujeitos e objetos, objetos animados e inanimados, sujeitos desejantes e desejados, entes tomados como ou/ora origem ou/ora como destino nas pulsões ( Fédida, Winnicott, Freud)?]

Many external things, usually inert from the epistemological point of view, can be transformed into what I call epistemic mediators, which are illustrated in the last part of the paper, together with an analysis of the related notions of “perceptual and inceptual rehearsal” and of “external representation”.

Como sugere Magnani, o próprio conceito de "clareza", e seu uso como critério de validação de argumentos, é estranha para a filosofia moderna, pois esta seria inconsistente com a pretensão de autonomia do pensamento individual (Kant). Ao ser retomado, a partir da da tradição escolástica, por Peirce, o uso desse critério de validação dos argumentos e percepções repõe as questões sobre qual o fundamento ou os procesos de "fixação da clareza". Pode-se inferir, da discussão desenvolvida em "Manipulativa Abduction", que os sistemas (ou melhor, os "arranjos") de artefatos que propiciam/são dispostas para a realização das abduções manipulativas (incluindo arranjos artefatuais rituais) como produções de ambientalidades operacionais, (ou de "âncoras abdutivas", como propõe Bardone, 2010), contextos de mobilização deliberativas eou zootecnológica (Vehlken, 2013; Thacker e Gallaway, 2007)

A hipótese que se desenha aqui é que estes arranjos meta-cognitivos incluem aqueles que corporificam os processos políticos de subjetivação coletiva (Kantorowicz, 1998; Apostolides, 1993; Debray, 1993; Warner, 1992; Lefort, 1979): as máscaras de anonimização das decisões judicais, as três "isos" da democracia (-nomia, -goria, -psefia), a virtualização geradora da noção de "público" pela imprensa de tipos móveis (o Vajracchedika impresso pelo budismo maaiana), a abstração do pertencimento ao coletivo religioso através do estriamento do espaço (Quibla/mirhab, trigonometria, óptica), a perspectiva como transformação da percepção corporal em instrumento de conhecimento compartilhável (perceptio cum expressio, ref. Sobchack)

Seção 1. Introduction

whether or not concrete manipulations of external objects influence the generation of hypotheses

Que pergunta estranha. Sim ou não influencia?  Que timidez é essa, depois de já tanto ter escrito sobre cognição distribuída. LM parte de um patamar bem básico, defender o uso do conceito de abdução na pesquisa sobre formação de hipóteses.

A figura inclui duas classes de abduções (modelizadas e sentenciais) sob a categoria geral das abuduções teóricas. Vai, em seguida contrastar essas com as abduções manipulativas

Seção 2. Sentential Abduction

O critério de distinção é apresentado por uma metáfora (ou antes: uma catacrese) corporal: inferências hipotéticas teóricas são "internas" -- as manipulativas são "externas". (É algo surpreendente que LM não conecte em momento algum essa analogia à discussão de Peirce sobre as máquinas lógicas ou raciocinantes... )

The secret of all reasoning machines is after all very simple. It is that whatever relations among the objects reasoned about is destined to be the hinge of a ratiocination, that same general relation must be capable of being introduced between certain parts of the machine. (...) This is the same principle which lies at the foundation of every logical algebra; only in the algebra, instead of depending directly on the laws of nature, we establish conventional rules for the relations used. When we perform a reasoning in our unaided minds we do substantially the same thing, that is to say, we construct an image in our fancy under certain general conditions, and observe the result. In this point of view, too, every machine is a reasoning machine, in so much as there are certain relations between its parts, which relations involve other relations that were not expressly intended. A piece of apparatus for performing a physical or chemical experiment is also a reasoning machine, with this difference, that it does not depend on the laws of the human mind, but on the objective reason embodied in the laws of nature. (Peirce, 1887 | Logical Machines | W 6:69-70)

(negritos nossos: outras catacreses de qualidades de artefatos)

Ocorre, na discussão de Magnani (e Fédida) a inversão da algo ironica pressuposição peirceana de uma servidão da máquina à iniciativa do desejo humano, ["We no more want an original machine, than a house-builder would want an original journeyman, or an American board of trustees would hire an original professor. If, however, we will not surrender to the machine, the whole business of initiative is still thrown upon the mind; and this is the principal labor.", Peirce, 1887 | Logical Machines | W 6:70-71]) de uma reversão na determinação, em que a mente "externa" do desenvolvimento e uso de artefatos organiza a mente "interna", o pensamento simbólico discursivo modelizado ou sentencial (i.e. modelizado por línguas fonéticas).

A hipótese mais ousada é que o simbólico humano depende da mobilização de artefatos para se arrimar, instaurar, organizar e, em seguida, (como demonstram as recorrentes catacreses acima) para se autoconhecer, como aponta Kittler, 2016). Seria, segundo ela, necessário um artefato ou arranjo de artefatos, como um espelho, para as sensações corporais serem consolidadas perceptualmente como a posse de um corpo, e de reflexão sobre as regularidades do movimento deste corpo para se instaurar o sujeito como protagonista das pulsões que movem o corpo. É preciso de u artefato, a máscara, para se assumir uma persona para si, assim como para ser incorporado em um papel social.

De volta ao M-B&MAIS:

... theoretical abduction is the process of inferring certain facts and/or laws and hypotheses that render some sentences plausible, that explain or discover some (eventually new) phenomenon or observation; it is the process of reasoning in which explanatory hypotheses are formed and evaluated.

Em referência a Deleuze (Lógica do Sentido), e em referência à Progressão Inferencial Normal (PIN), diríamos que as abduções teóricas gerariam abduções de significado (ou seja, constituem a inferência de pistas [Ab4] a partir de [Ab3] metáforas previamente configuradas), enquanto as abduções manipulativas gerariam abduções de sentido (de presságios (Ab1) para sintomas (Ab2) e deles para (Ab3) metáforas).

Na leitura dessa longa sessão 2 a argumentação a respeito do Select and Test Model parecem confirmar a nossa formulação sobre a PIN:

... can be described in terms of the classical notions of abduction, deduction and induction; it describes the different roles played by such basic inference types in developing various kinds of medical reasoning (diagnosis, therapy planning, monitoring) but can be extended and regarded also as an illustration of scientific theory change. The model is consistent with the Peircian view about the various stages of scientific inquiry in terms of “hypothesis” generation, deduction (prediction), and induction.

Apagogé: geração de novas hipóteses, abdução. Haveria, no sentido de apagogé, um foco maior na produção eou seleção de hipóteses plausíveis e "melhor explicação", o que já supõe uma filtragem segundo critérios de consistencia (na indução qualitativa, Ind1), eventualmente de um "estoque" de explicações preexistente:

There are two main epistemological meanings of the word abduction: (1) abduction that only generates “plausible” hypotheses (selective or creative) and (2) abduction considered as inference to the best explanation, which also evaluates hypotheses (Figure 2)

(...)

All we can expect of our “selective” abduction, is that it tends to produce hypotheses for further examination that have some chance of turning out to be the best explanation. Selective abduction will always produce hypotheses that give at least a partial explanation and therefore have a small amount of initial plausibility.

A questão da "clareza" (i.e., sua construção a partir da interação "metodogênica" com arranjos de artefatos) fica posta ao examinar a charneira inferencial entre a última abudução (explicação) para a primeira indução (qualitativa), que Peirce também chama de "previsão": nesse ponto, decide-se o que procurar e onde, pra verificar a consistência de uma explicação. A Indução qualitativa

[Qualitative Induction] consists of those inductions which are neither founded upon experience in one mass, as Crude Induction [Ind3] is, nor upon a collection of numerable instances of equal evidential values [as in Quantitative Induction, Ind2], but upon a stream of experience in which the relative evidential values of different parts of it have to be estimated according to our sense of the impressions they make upon us. Qualitative Induction consists in the investigator’s first deducing from the retroductive hypothesis as great an evidential weight of genuine conditional predictions as he can conveniently undertake to make and to bring to the test...

(Peirce decompõe a Ind1 em uma dedução a partir da explicação e uma escolha orientada por uma abdução de "geração/seleção de hipóteses plausíveis" ou "melhor explicação". Isso torna aceitável separar a dedução dessa operação de escolha entre previsões configuradas por uma informação colateral que define o critério de "melhor" e de "plausível".) Magnani usa mais algumas páginas para definir e diferenciar os três tipos básicos de argumentos, para então retornar à discussão das "abduções seletivas" do seu ST-Model:

selective abduction is the making of a preliminary guess that introduces a set of plausible diagnostic hypotheses, followed by deduction to explore their consequences, and by induction to test them with available patient data, (1) to increase the likelihood of a hypothesis by noting evidence explained by that one, rather than by competing hypotheses, or (2) to refute all but one.

Ou seja: essa abdução seletiva pertenceria última indução (a explicação) antes da dedução, e esta, antes da indução quantitativa ("inductions which are ... founded ... upon a collection of numerable instances of equal evidential values, "). Ou seja, diferentemente de Peirce, que compacta [explicação-dedução-indução qt] na "indução qualitativa" (por que?), Magnani separa a produção de hipóteses "plausíveis" (ou "melhores explicações"), da derivação corolarial de testes/observações e ambas da ponderação do grau de consistencia da hipótese com os fenômenos (por que?).

If during this first cycle new information emerges, hypotheses not previously considered can be suggested and a new cycle takes place. In this case the nonmonotonic character of abductive reasoning is clear and arises from the logical unsoundness of the inference rule: it draws defeasible conclusions from incomplete information. All recent logical accounts (“deductive”) concerning abduction have pointed out that it is a form of nonmonotonic reasoning. It is important to allow the guessing of explanations for a situation, in order to discount and abandon old hypotheses, so as to enable the tentative adoption of new ones, when new information about the situation makes them no longer the best.

Um novo ciclo... mas quão longo ou profundo ele é? Certamente, não vamos retornar aos ícones puros, aos presságios ou intuições. Há graus variados de "não-monotonia". LM então considera as limitações de definições analíticas de abdução, para justificar o esforço de compreender a abdução manipulativa:

Some of the formal models of abductive reasoning are based on the theory of the epistemic state of an agent (Boutilier and Becher, 1995), where the epistemic state of an individual is modeled as a consistent set of beliefs that can change by expansion and contraction (belief revision framework). This kind of sentential frameworks seems to exclusively deal with selective abduction (diagnostic reasoning) and relates to the idea of preserving consist- ency. If we want to provide a suitable framework for analyzing the most interesting cases of conceptual changes in science we do not have to limit ourselves to the sentential view of theoretical abduction but we have to consider a broader inferential one which encom- passes both sentential and what I call model-based sides of creative abduction.

Note-se que ele situa essas abduções prêt-a-porter (seletivas do plausível e da melhor explicação) já partidno do estágio abdutivo do diagnóstico (ou "cenário", Ab5).

3. Model Based Abduction

O mais relevante dessa seção, a meu parecer, é o reconhecimento das abduções mais elaboradas (diagnósticos, Ab5; e explicações, Ab6) como consolidadoras de sensações e constituintes de agentes, na medida em que estariam na base dos juízos de percepção -- assunto a partir do qual já podemos estabelecer conexões com as teorias da percepção de Alva Noë, assim como com as da mediatização da percepção (Benjamin, Goody, Christin, Sobchack, Kittler, Tomas).

Most of these forms of “constitution” of phenomena are creative and, moreover, characterized in a model-based way. (...) As we have already stressed, Peirce considers inferential any cognitive activity whatever, not only conscious abstract thought; he also includes perceptual knowledge and subconscious cognitive activity. For instance in subconscious mental activities visual representations play an immediate role. We should remember, as Peirce noted, that abduction plays a role even in relatively simple visual phenomena. Visual abduction, a special form of non verbal abduction, occurs when hypotheses are instantly derived from a stored series of previous similar experi- ences. It covers a mental procedure that tapers into a non-inferential one, and falls into the category called “perception”. Philosophically, perception is viewed by Peirce as a fast and uncontrolled knowledge-production procedure. Perception, in fact, is a vehicle for the instantaneous retrieval of knowledge that was previously structured in our mind through inferential processes. Peirce says: “Abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them” (Peirce, 1955b, p. 304).

Serendipicamente, porém, LM negligencia a organização (ideológica) da percepão cotidiana:

Of course such subconscious visual abduc- tions of everyday cognitive behavior are not of particular importance but we know that in science they may be very significant and lead to interesting new discoveries (Magnani et al., 1994; Shelley, 1996). If perceptions are abductions they are withdrawable, just like the scientific hypotheses abductively found. They are “hypotheses” about data we can accept (sometimes this happens spontaneously) or carefully evaluate.

E com isso, passa ao largo do caráter político da economia de construção de arranjos artefatuais de abduções manipulativas que fundam as subjetividades individuais, do simbólico e vida social.

Peirce gives an interesting example of model-based abduction (Magnani, 1999a, 2001a) related to sense activity: “A man can distinguish different textures of cloth by feeling: but not immediately, for he requires to move fingers over the cloth, which shows that he is obliged to compare sensations of one instant with those of another” (CP 5.221); this idea surely suggests that abductive movements also have interesting extra-theoretical characteristics and that there is a role in abductive reasoning for various kinds of manipula- tions of external objects.

Essa é a teoria de "Action in Perception": a correlação entre os movimentos do corpo e as mudanças de sensações são o gabarito de construção da percepção da realidade. Mas diria que são meta-teóricos e pro-teóricos, não apenas extra-teóricos.

...all knowing is inferring and inferring is not instantaneous, it happens in a process that needs an activity of comparisons involving many kinds of models in a more or less considerable lapse of time. All sensations or perceptions participate in the nature of a unifying hypothesis, that is, in abduction, in the case of emotions too:

“Thus the various sounds made by the instruments of the orchestra strike upon the ear, and the result is a peculiar musical emotion, quite distinct from the sounds themselves. This emotion is essentially the same thing as a hypothetic inference, and every hypothetic inference involved the formation of such an emotion” (CP 2.643).

LM segue Nancy Nersessian (1999) na explanação da concepção de abdução modelizada:

Following Nersessian (1999), I use the term “model-based reasoning” to indicate the construction and manipulation of various kinds of representations, not necessarily sentential and/or formal.

She proposes the so-called cognitive history and philosophy of science approach, which affords a reframing of the problem of conceptual formation and change in science that not only provides philosophical insights but also pays attention to the practices employed by real human agents in constructing, communicating and replacing representation of a domain. (Common examples of model-based reasoning are constructing and manipulating visual representations, thought experiment, analogical reasoning, but also the so-called “tunnel effect” (Cornuéjols et al., 2000), occurring when models are built at the intersection of some operational interpretation domain – with its interpretation capabilities – and a new ill-known domain.

(...) Visual abduction, but also many kinds of abductions involving analogies, diagrams, thought experimenting, visual imagery, etc. in scientific discovery processes, can be just called model-based.

4. Manipulative Abduciton

A correlação de base, a explorar do ponto de vista da filosofia política, é com o Visualização e Cognição - Vendo com olhos e mãos, de Latour. Latour se omite em conectar a instauração dos Estados Nacionais como máquinas coloniais através de arranjos artefatuais de produção de poder-saber, acumuladores e combinadores de evidências para mobilização e vitória estratégica em controvérsias (agravada pela crítica fácil ao marxismo ortodoxo como "escada" contra a poltização da investigação sobre a arquitetura da desigualdade embarcada na "inflação de híbridos" das "redes sociotécnicas" da modernidade). Mas nós não precisamos de álibis pois nosso esforço é fazer a "filosofia reversa" dessas máquinas para distribuir poder.

Manipulative abduction (...) happens when we are thinking through doing and not only, in a pragmatic sense, about doing. (...) It refers to an extra-theoretical behavior that aims at creating communicable accounts of new experiences to integrate them into previously existing systems of experimental and linguistic (theoretical) practices. Gooding (1990) refers to this kind of concrete manipulative reasoning when he illustrates the role in science of the so-called “construals” that embody tacit inferences in procedures that are often apparatus and machine based. The embodiment is of course an expert manipulation of objects in a highly constrained experimental environment, and is directed by abductive movements that imply the strategic application of old and new templates of behavior in some cases connected with extra-rational components, for instance emotional, esthetical, ethical, and economic.

The hypothetical character of construals is clear: they can be developed to examine or discard further chances, they are provisional creative organization of experience and some of them become in their turn hypothetical interpretations of experience, that is more theory-oriented, their reference is gradually stabilized in terms of established observational practices. Step by step the new interpretation – that at the beginning is completely “practice-laden” – relates to more “theoretical” modes of understanding (narrative, visual, diagrammatic, symbolic, conceptual, simulative), closer to the constructive effects of theoretical abduction. When the reference is stabilized the effects of incommensurability with other established observations can become evident. But it is just the construal of certain phenomena that can be shared by the sustainers of rival theories. (...)

Moreover, the experience is constructed, reconstructed, and distributed across a social network of negotiations among the different scientists by means of construals.

A corporificação e a presença são decisivas para as abduções manipulativas (ouvimos no fundo os comentários de Fédida sobre a atitude clownesca de Winnicott, imprescindível para a clinica psicoterapeutica para crianças)

The activity of building construals is highly conjectural and not immediately explanatory: these templates are hypotheses of behavior (creative or already cognitively present in the scientist’s mind-body system, and sometimes already applied) that abductively enable a kind of epistemic “doing”. Hence, some templates of action and manipulation can be selected in the set of the ones available and pre-stored, others have to be created for the first time to perform the most interesting creative cognitive accomplishments of manipulative abduction. Moreover, I think that a better understanding of manipulative abduction at the level of scientific experiment could improve our knowledge of induction, and its distinction from abduction: manipulative abduction could be considered as a kind of basis for further meaningful inductive generalizations. Different generated construals can give rise to different inductive generalizations.

O que nos sugere que a introjeção dos arranjos artefatuais retóricos é que define os "gabaritos tácitos" que coalescem como "clareza semiósica" (em cada um dos seus três graus) e participam de cada modo de fixação da crença.

Some common features of these tacit templates (...) that enable us to manipulate things and experiments in science are related to:

(1) sensibility to the aspects of the phenomenon which can be regarded as curious or anomalous; manipulations have to be able to introduce potential inconsistencies in the received knowledge. (...);

(2) preliminary sensibility to the dynamical character of the phenomenon, and not to entities and their properties, common aim of manipulations is to practically reorder the dynamic sequence of events in a static spatial one that should promote a subsequent bird’s-eye view (narrative or visual-diagrammatic);

(3) referral to experimental manipulations that exploit artificial apparatus to free new possibly stable and repeatable sources of information about hidden knowledge and constraints (...). Of course this information is not artificially made by us: the fact that phenomena are made and manipulated does not render them to be idealistically and subjectively determined;

(4) various contingent ways of epistemic acting: looking from different perspectives, checking the different information available, comparing subsequent events, choosing, discarding, imaging further manipulations, re-ordering and changing relationships in the world by implicitly evaluating the usefulness of a new order (for instance, to help memory).

E então, LM conecta essa caracterização das abduções manipulativas com a sua teoria mais ampla da "cognição distribuída" (que, como já vimos, já está em semente na discussão de Peirce sobre "máquinas raciocinativas")

The whole activity of manipulation is devoted to build various external epistemic mediators that function as an enormous new source of information and knowledge. Therefore, manipulative abduction represents a kind of redistribution of the epistemic and cognitive effort to manage objects and information that cannot be immediately represented or found internally (...). If we see scientific discovery like a kind of opportunistic ability of integrating information from many kinds of simultaneous constraints to produce explanatory hypotheses that account for them all, then manipulative abduction will play the role of eliciting possible hidden constraints by building external suitable experimental structures. So external well-built structures (...) and their contents in terms of new information and knowledge, will be projected onto internal structures (...) so joining the constructive effect of theoretical abduction. The inter play between manipulative and theoretical abduction consists of a superimposition of internal and external, where the elements of the external structures gain new meanings and relationships to one another, thanks to the constructive explanatory theoretical activity (...). This interplay expresses the fact that both internal and external processes are part of the same epistemic ecology.

Mais uma vez, a metáfora topológica (dentro/fora) repõe, de modo despolitizado, a concepção tipicamente ocidental de pensamento como abstração, performada por agentes individuais humanos (Jullien, 2008). Tudo que é "fora" na verdade, é dentro do pensamento compartilhado, coletivo, público.

...expert performers use action in everyday life to create an external model of task dynamics that can be used in lieu of an internal model... (...) Not only a way for moving the world to desirable states, action performs an epistemic and not merely performatory role: people structure their worlds to simplify cognitive tasks but also in presence of incomplete information or of a diminished capacity to act upon the world when they surely have less opportunities to know. Epistemic action can also be described as resulting from the exploitation of latent constraint in the human-environment system. This additional constraint grants additional information

Na discussão de "Mediadores epistêmicos", já encontramos claramente as características dos "artefatos rituais" como as máscaras cerimoniais, as festas, o uso coletivo ritual de psicotrópicos, a óstia, o Vajracchekia maaiana ou a Qibla muçulmana. O ponto é que, sem eles, talvez não a humanidade sequer teria se diferenciado como "espécie semiótica"

The concept of manipulative abduction is devoted to capture the role of action in many interesting situations: action provides otherwise unavailable information that enables the agent to solve problems by starting and performing a suitable abductive process of generation or selection of hypotheses. Also natural phenomena can play the role of external artifactual models: the stars are not artifacts, but under Micronesian navigator’s manipulations of the images of them, the stars acquire a structure that “becomes one of the most important structured representational media of the Micronesian system” (Hutchins, 1995, p. 172). The external artifactual models are endowed with functional properties as components of a memory system crossing the boundary between person and environment (for example they are able to transform the tasks involved in allowing simple manipulations that promote further visual inferences at the level of model-based abduction).

De volta a Peirce: se toda máquina é uma máquina de pensar, talvez o próprio pensamento seja necessariamente organizado pelo uso de retórico de material (Fédida).

... many external things that usually are inert from the epistemological point of view can be transformed into epistemic or cognitive mediators. For example we can use our body: we can talk with ourselves, exploiting in this case the self- regulatory character of this action, we can use fingers and hands for counting, we can also use external “tools” like writing, narratives, others persons’ information, concrete models and diagrams, various kinds of pertinent artifacts. Hence, not all of the cognitive tools are inside the head, sometimes it is useful to use external objects and structures as epistemic devices. We indicated above that Micronesian navigator’s stars, that are natural objects, become very complicated epistemic artifacts, when inserted in the various cognitive manipulations (of seeing them) related to navigation.

(...)

a lot of new information in science is reached by observations and experiments, and experiments are the fruit of various kinds of artifactual manipulations: the different strategies correspond to the expert manipulations of objects in a highly constrained experimental environment, directed by abductive movements that imply the application of old and new extra-theoretical templates of behavior.

... “scientific” thinking is related to the manipulation of a material and experi- mental environment that is no longer natural. Knowledge is finally seen as something cognitively distributed across scientists, their internal “minds”, and external artifacts and instruments. Experi- ments and instruments embody in their turn external crystallizations of knowledge and practice. Modern science is made by this interplay of internal and external.

Gabaritos Manipulativos

From the general point of view of everyday situations manipulative abductive reasoning exhibits other very interesting features:

(1) action elaborates a simplification of the reasoning task and a redistribution of effort across time when we “need to manipulate concrete things in order to understand structures which are otherwise too abstract” (Piaget, 1974), or when we are in presence of redundant and unmanageable information;

(2) action can be useful in presence of incomplete or inconsistent information – not only from the “perceptual” point of view – or of a dimin- ished capacity to act upon the world: it is used to get more data to restore coherence and to improve deficient knowledge;

(3) action as a control of sense data illustrates how we can change the position of our body (and/or of the external objects) and how to exploit various kinds of prostheses (...) to get various new kinds of stimulation: action provides some tactile and visual information (...), otherwise unavailable;

(4) action enables us to build external artifactual models of task mechanisms instead of the corresponding internal ones, that are adequate to adapt the environment to agent’s needs: experimental manipulations exploit artificial apparatus to free new possible stable and repeatable sources of information about hidden knowledge and constraints.

5. PERCEPTUAL AND INCEPTUAL REHEARSAL

Following Ippolito and Tweney (1995) the concept of inceptual rehearsal is useful to cognitively illustrate situations like the one previously indicated. “Perceptual rehearsal”, as the “saturation of one or more of the senses with all the aspects of the phenomenon of interest to the discoverer is a means of defeating the impact of unexpected sights” (p. 435). It is the ability to see complex patterns (and old problems from a new angle) using various kinds of manipu- lations of the external world, generating perceptions (and so critical constraints) to serve his mind’s eye. For example, in the case of Faraday, the experiments amount to considering very simple phys- ical setups and making them move spatially again and again, as if he were perceptually rehearsing the phenomena. That is Faraday had to see in his mind’s eye the phenomena at hand, and he then had to modify the phenomena to perform “tests” of his hypotheses. After the perceptual rehearsal his mind internally considered the rehearsed impressions to start inceptions, which incorporated the constraints gained by perceptual rehearsal. He then was able to build apparatus to “instantiate” those hypotheses, and, finally, through the subsequent “inceptual rehearsal”, some selected aspects of his perceptual experiences were magnified and improved.

These presymbolic (sometimes unconscious, i.e. not represented – Miller, 1992) inceptions form the background for the construction of a new mental model, by transforming and recasting (“independ- ently” of the visual and experimental apparatus) the perceptual elements in a way which favors the heuristics used to arrive to the final “symbolic” solution of the given problem:...

These inceptions are “perceptual-like internal cognitions that serve as semi-abstract test beds for Faraday’s theory”, like in the case of Faraday’s exploration of optical deception of 1831, a prototype of this kind of cognitive process (Tweney, forthcoming). Manipulative interchanges with the environment (experiments, models, apparatus, diagrams, cultural entities such as mathematical tools), where sub-symbolic processes dominate, are very important: rarely scientific creativity can be understood in terms of a simple process of recom- bination of symbols, these are just the product of scientific creative thought.

6. EXTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS

In the case of the construction and examination of diagrams in scientific reasoning, specific experiments serve as states and the implied operators are the manipulations and observations that trans-form one state into another. The scientific outcome is dependent upon practices and specific sensory-motor activities performed on a nonsymbolic object, which acts as a dedicated external representa- tional medium supporting the various operators at work. There is a kind of an epistemic negotiation between the sensory framework of the scientist and the external reality of the object. This process involves an external representation consisting of written symbols, shapes, and figures that are manipulated “by hand”. The cognitive system is not merely the mind-brain of the person performing the scientific task, but the system consisting of the whole body (cognition is embodied) of the person plus the external physical representation. In scientific discovery the whole activity of cognition is located in the system consisting of a human together with external objects.

An external representation can modify the kind of computation that a human agent uses to reason about a problem:.... The capacity for inner reasoning and thought results from the internalization of the originally external forms of representation. In the case of the external representations we can have various objectified knowledge and structure (...), but also external rules, relations, and constraints incorporated in physical situations (...) (Zhang, 1997). The external representations are contrasted to the internal representations that consist of the knowledge and the structure in memory, as proposi- tions, productions, schemas, neural networks, models, prototypes, images.

All external representations, if not too complex, can be transformed in internal representations by memorization. But this is not always necessary if the external representations are easily available. Internal representations can be transformed in external representations by externalization, that can be productive “if the benefit of using external representations can offset the cost associated with the externalization process” (p. 181). Hence, contrarily to the received view in cognitive science (Newell, 1990), not all cognitive processes happen in the internal model of the external environment. The information present in the external world can be directly picked out without the mediation of memory, deliberation, etc. Moreover, various different external devices can determine different internal ways of reasoning and cognitively solve the problems: ...

The external representations are not merely memory aids: they can give people access to knowledge and skills that are unavailable to internal representations, help researchers to easily identify aspects and to make further inferences, they constrain the range of possible cognitive outcomes in a way that some actions are allowed and other forbidden. The mind is limited because of the restricted range of information processing, the limited power of working memory and attention, the limited speed of some learning and reasoning operations; on the other hand the environment is intricate, because of the huge amount of data, real time requirement, uncertainty factors.

Consequently, we have to consider the whole system, consisting of both internal and external representations, and their role in optimiz- ing the whole cognitive performance of the distribution of the various subtasks.

(Anotações de Denise)

A seção 3 me remeteu à noção de paradigmas como orientadores da observação de fenômenos científicos (T. Kuhn);

• Kuhn, T. (1962);

A percepção relacionada ao movimento e ação do corpo no ambiente guarda conexões com a Fenomenologia de Husserl e de Merleau Ponty;

• Ponty, M. (1945) Fenomenologia da percepção;
• Husser (1950) Meditações cartesianas;

Arendt reconhece a especial importância do telescópio como propulsor de conhecimento, chegando a afirmar que "Não foi a razão, mas um instrumento feito pela mão do homem, o telescópio, que realmente mudou a concepção física do mundo; o que os levou ao novo conhecimento não foi a contemplação, nem a observação, nem a especulação, mas a ativa interferência do homo faber, da atividade de fazer e de fabricar" (A condição humana, seção 38).

• Arendt (1958) A condição humana.

(Anotações da Juliana)

Isopsefia (ἴσος isos, em grego, significa "igual" e ψῆφος psephos significa "pedregulho") - é a palavra grega para a antiga prática de juntar os valores numéricos das letras de uma palavra para formar um único número. Os gregos mais antigos usavam arranjos de pedregulhos (ou seixos) para estudar aritmética e geometria.(https://www.wikiwand.com/pt/Isopsefia)

catacrese - figura de linguagem que consiste no uso de uma palavra ou expressão que não descreve com exatidão o que se quer expressar, mas é adotada por não haver uma outra palavra apropriada - ou a palavra apropriada não é de uso comum; é uma gíria do cotidiano, expressão usada para facilitar a comunicação. É, pois, uma metáfora já desgastada. Estabelecem comparação às situações em que são atribuídas, qualidades de seres vivos, a seres inanimados. Exemplos comuns são: "os pés da mesa", "marmelada de banana", "vinagre de maçã", "cabeça do alfinete", "braço de rio", "dente de alho", etc.. Consiste assim em uma metáfora de uso comum, deixando de ser considerada como tal. Consiste também em dar à palavra uma significação que ela não tem, por falta de termo próprio, empregando-as fora do seu significado real. No entanto, devido ao uso contínuo, não mais se percebe que estão sendo usadas no sentido figurado. (https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catacrese)